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Abstract. This article considers the socio-geographical ap-
proach carried out as part of the MedUp program. It presents
a study of the ways that the French “actors” manage forecast
uncertainties during a flash flood warning process. In order
to better understand the role of forecasts’ uncertainties in de-
cision making, we focused on the actions people took and
how what they say explains their actions. The practices of ac-
tors involved in warnings for the Vidourle watershed (Gard,
France), in particular, are analyzed using a practice-based
approach. A set of categories of the “actors” was devel-
oped based on their descriptions of the problems they faced
during the flash flood warning, independent of their socio-
professional status and position in the warning chain. Five
actor profiles result from this: Translators, Managers, Com-
mitted, Navigators and Vulnerable. For each profile, specific
action contexts are defined, determining how each deals with
uncertainty.
1 Introduction
With the emergence of issues regarding climate change, un-
certainty in meteorological forecasting became a key topic in
several domains. For hydro-meteorologists, the issue is quan-
tifying uncertainties and their propagation in hydrological
models and forecasts (Rossa et al., 2010). Another question
social scientists face regards how to communicate uncertain-
ties to users (Morss et al., 2008; Demeritt et al., 2010) and
the impact of uncertain knowledge transfer on decision mak-
ing and policies with regard to climate change, now and in
the future (Wynne, 1992; Shackley and Wynne, 1996; Adger
et al., 2005).
The MedUp program, which primarily focuses on the
propagation of uncertainty in hydro-meteorological forecast-
ing models, likewise allowed us to characterize actors’ prac-
tices while managing the warning process and specifically to
study their behaviors related to the forecasts’ uncertainties.
Considering the many actors involved in the whole warning
process, this paper focuses on an observation of actors’ actual
practices, and how they consider uncertainty in their decision
making and actions during potential flash flood situations.
Section 1 is a review of the literature concerning the ques-
tion of uncertainty in decision making and, more specifically,
in flood scenarios. Section 2 presents the methodology used
to observe actors’ practices during a warning process, the
case study, the sample and the data collected. Then, Sect. 3
shares the results of the analysis and the profiles that corre-
spond to the different actors. It also explores the role of the
aforementioned uncertainty in the warning process. Finally,
Sect. 4 takes a broader look at the contributions and limits of
this approach, as they relate to uncertainty in the field of risk
management.
2 Uncertainty and action: literature review
This section explores the existing literature on decision mak-
ing, action procedures and the role of uncertainty in such sce-
narios. It likewise aims to define the concepts used in the pa-
per, particularly the notion of warning process.
2.1 Uncertainty and decision making
In the social sciences, several authors have approached the
question of uncertainty and decision making by focusing
on specific hydro-meteorological phenomena, basing their
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investigations on flood risk management (e.g. Downton et al.,
2005; Demeritt et al., 2007; Morss et al., 2008; Frick and
Hegg, 2011). Their aim was to better understand how deci-
sion makers manage uncertainty in different situations: for
instance, in predicting flood risk (Downton et al., 2005),
in communicating everyday weather forecasts (Morss et al.,
2008) and within the warning and alert chain (Frick and
Hegg, 2011). They all showed that decision makers prefer
detailed information about uncertainty, as it allows them to
weight various alternatives (Downton et al., 2005, p.143) or
because they could make their own assessment of the situa-
tion (Frick and Hegg, 2011, p.302). Overall, they all found
that decision makers prefer having all the information avail-
able, including uncertainty estimation, which allows them to
have their own interpretation of the situation rather than to
follow particular recommendations. Their research findings
show that decision makers need information about uncer-
tainty to help them in the process of decisions and actions
to take, but how precisely do they use the uncertainty infor-
mation?
In most of the cases (except Morss et al., 2008), the people
interviewed were rather high-up in the decision-making pro-
cess. They tended to be administrative officers, flood man-
agers and civil protection managers. Do these people have the
same information needs as forecasters? Who decides which
information to give to whom? Do people living in or near the
floodplain have different information needs? How do they
decide to evacuate or to stay?
The earlier studies are usually based on the hypothesis of a
gap between decision makers’ needs and the scientific infor-
mation available. But what exactly is known about decision
makers’ needs along the decision making’ chain in these dif-
ferent situations? Do they all, and always, deal in the same
way with forecasts and probabilities and the inherent uncer-
tainty of this kind of information (Morss et al., 2008)?
Following the spirit of situated action theory (e.g. Conein
and Jacopin, 1994; Que´re´, 1997; De Fornel and Que´re´,
1999), we know that information cannot be interpreted and
integrated without a clear understanding of the action con-
text. What do we know about the different action contexts of
the decision makers in question here? Handmer and Proudley
(2007) showed that while much is known about how people
perceive probabilities and frequencies, less is known about
how this knowledge is used when making decisions and lead-
ing action in emergency situations.
In this paper we address the action processes linked with
flash flood warnings as a first question, and then highlight the
role of uncertainty in these action contexts.
Following Sorensen (2000), we already pointed to the in-
ability of the classical approach of warning systems in under-
standing the whole processes of decision making and action
in a real-life context (Cre´ton-Cazanave, 2009). In view of the
above, the MedUp program provided an opportunity to test
an alternative approach that focuses on the warning process
rather than on the warning system (Cre´ton-Cazanave et al.,
2009).
2.2 Defining the warning process and practice-based
approach
Going beyond the traditional approach of warning as a
communication issue (Cre´ton-Cazanave, 2010a), Chateau-
raynaud and Torny (1999) propose an original approach to
warning as a “dynamic process that is generative of social
and technical configurations” and that requires a very con-
crete engagement of actors into the world through their prac-
tices. For the authors, warnings are “not the product of a pre-
established system but contributes to continuously define the
system in a real-life context”; each warning uses, tests, re-
inforces and reconfigures the system of which it is a part.
The notion of process has already been considered in sev-
eral works on flood warnings (Drabek, 1999; Mileti, 1995),
but only with regard to the reception of/reaction to warnings
by the population (warning responses). Mucchielli’s (1998)
proposal, combined with AFNOR’s definition, allows us to
go beyond the question of response in order to define warn-
ing as the socio-technical process by which the reality of a
given situation is taken into consideration in order to estab-
lish its meaning, so as to constitute and coordinate action in
a context of assumed danger (Cre´ton-Cazanave, 2010b).
Therefore, warnings are less an issue of system or signal
reception than an issue of action in context (e.g. The´venot,
2006). Thus, we must look at the actual practices that allow
actors to carry out warning processes. We must understand
the implications of the situation, and how it affects and di-
rects the actions people take.
To this end, we use the French Pragmatic Sociology
(Nachi, 2006), that is related to so-called Practice-Based
studies, and enhance practice as an empirical object as well
as an epistemology. In this approach, the concept of practice
relies on three dimensions (Corradi et al., 2010):
1. the set of interconnected activities that, if socially rec-
ognized as a way of ordering, stabilize collective action
and the common orientation;
2. the sense-making process that supports the accountabil-
ity of a shared way of doing things and which allows for
the continuous negotiation (ethical and aesthetic) of the
meanings of a practice by its practitioners;
3. the social effects generated by a practice in connection
with other social practices. This is the dimension of the
reproduction of practice that answers the question as to
what purpose the practice serves.
We can see that this is really consistent with our defini-
tion of the warning process, and the approach leads us to a
study of warning-as-practice. Thus, we focused our observa-
tions on “what people do, what their work is like, and what
Nat. Hazards Earth Syst. Sci., 13, 1469–1479, 2013 www.nat-hazards-earth-syst-sci.net/13/1469/2013/
L. Cre´ton-Cazanave and C. Lutoff: Action during the warning process 1471
effort it takes to problem solve their respective combinations
of objects and ends” (Carlile, 2002) during a warning.
The question of uncertainty arises in such a situation: what
are its roles and implications on the practices of actors in-
volved in the warning process? Such an approach requires
using methods that will allow us to consider the entire pro-
cess. We take into account all the actors involved, from the
forecasters to the risk managers and the riverside residents.
In investigating the warning process, we study the supposed
gap between needs and available information, and we assess
if and how uncertainty is taken into account in this process.
3 Research design, data and methods
This section clarifies the methodological aspects of our study
and presents the case study and data used to carry out the
analysis.
3.1 Observing the concrete practices of actors
Based on the earlier research cited above, we observe the
entire warning process, as it is carried out by the different
actors involved, in practice and in context. We used the same
interview grid for all the actors we encountered, so as to not
introduce any a priori distinction between them. It was es-
sential to consider all actors equally, without assuming any
differential of rationality, scientificity or issues with regard
to interaction between them. This symmetry (Bloor, 1976)
was maintained throughout the analysis.
Our protocol was based on semi-directive interviews as
defined by Huntington, with open and free answers, and in-
terventions for helping interviewees develop specific points
(Huntington, 1998). The interviews focused on two dimen-
sions: 1) actors’ usual practices, i.e. what they usually do
(and how) when a flood occurs, and 2) a reconstruction of
their specific warning activities during the major 2005 flood
event in the Gard region. The interview guide included two
key questions:
1. Can you describe how you carry out a flood warning?
2. Can you tell me what happened in 2005?
With this second question, the goal was to have them ex-
plain what took place during this event in particular, with
special attention to time markers. This phase of the interview
allowed us to introduce more thickness (Geertz, 1973) in the
description of the 2005 process, taking into account not only
the facts, but also the meaning attached to them by the ac-
tors, as well as the practices that produce these facts (i.e. the
triggers of action from which the facts result).
Close attention was paid to the specific skills and the re-
lationships involved both in normal activities and during the
warning process.
Note that in this interview grid, uncertainty was not the
focus of our investigation. It was not directly mentioned. Un-
derstanding the warning process based on actors’s practices
and the issue of action in general meant not focusing on the
issues faced by researchers. On the contrary, we attempted to
describe the modalities of actors’ actions as they understand
and execute them, and then we analyzed the role of uncer-
tainty.
3.2 Case study: a flash flood warning process
For this study, and in accordance with MedUp project
members, we focused our analyses on the Vidourle water-
shed (Gard department, Southern France) (Fig. 1), which
presents a number of interesting characteristics:
– A relatively short coastal river (85 km), this site allowed
us to observe all the geographical configurations from
its source in the Cevenol mountains (where the river
freely evolves along the mountain slopes), through the
Petite Camargue in the Gard plain (which is currently
in the process of re-urbanizing (Balk, 1945; Bauer and
Roux, 1976)), to its outlet at the seaside town of Grau du
Roi. The characteristics of the relationships the different
residents have with the river likewise differ, depending,
in particular, on whether their area is diked or not.
– The Vidourlades are an old, recurring phenomenon of
violent flash floods in the Vidourle catchment, well-
known within the entire Gard department. From this
specificity results, all along the Vidourle river, a gradual
development of a veritable culture based on these phe-
nomena and the river’s development, as well as abun-
dant regional and historical literature (e.g. Gaussen,
1968; Coeur, 2007). As a border river between two
French departments (the Gard and the He´rault), this site
also allowed us to consider some institutional aspects of
the warning process.
– All types of actors involved in warning processes are
present in this area, from State monitoring (SPC Grand
Delta) to private contractors who propose their decision
making aid services to towns when floods may occur.
Finally, this area also has a reputation for efficiency in
terms of water crisis management, and is therefore an inter-
esting choice for this reason. While quantifying the efficiency
of warnings is difficult (Carsell et al., 2004), the warnings
that people in the Vidourle basin have seen have been more
or less effective. At least this is what numerous actors in civil
protection at the department-wide level say, especially re-
garding the complexity of issues to be resolved and the num-
ber of small warnings they must deal with each year. The Vi-
dourle Plan was validated as a National Pilot Project in 2003.
This site therefore seemed especially interesting in terms of
identifying and understanding what factors lead to the suc-
cessfully carrying out of warnings and how uncertainty may
be handled.
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Fig. 1. Vidourle watershed.
The choice of the Vidourle basin allowed us to determine
the starting point for the warning process we wanted to ob-
serve, and thus to identify, in a bottom-up manner, the actors
involved in this warning process.
3.3 Specificity of the sample
The sample of individuals questioned was defined based on
the aforementioned need to consider the warning process in
all its dimensions. Specifically, this meant identifying all the
actors concretely involved in the process, officially or other-
wise. Gray literature concerning the official organization of
warnings according to the State and post-event investigation
reports served as our basis for identifying the initial set of
actors who intervened at different times during the warning
process and on different spatial levels:
– For weather forecasting : The National Center of
Forecasts (Centre National de Pre´vision, CNP) in
Toulouse, The Inter-regional Meteorological Center
(Centre Me´te´orologique Inter-re´gional, CMIR) in Aix-
en-Provence and The Departmental Meteorological
Center (Centre De´partemental de Me´te´orologie, CDM)
in Nimes;
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– for flood advisory : The Hydro-meteorological Service
Center and Flood Prevention Support (Service Cen-
tral d’Hydrome´te´orologie et d’Appui a` la Pre´vention
des Inondations, SCHAPI) in Toulouse and The Flood
Forecasting Service in Nimes (Service de Pre´vision des
Crues Grand Delta, SPC-GD);
– for handling the event and informing the public at the
department-wide level: The Inter-ministerial Service for
Defence and Civil Protection (Service Interministe´riel
de De´fense et de Protection Civile, SIDPC) in Nimes,
and the radio station “Radio France Bleu Gard/Loze`re”;
– for handling the event at the local level : mayors, who
are responsible for warning their districts and a private
company specialized in aiding decision making for the
induction of town-wide protection plans (Plans Com-
munaux de Sauvegarde).
On this basis, we allowed the actors to define themselves
amongst themselves throughout the course of our fieldwork.
With the snowball effect, we saw individuals who are usually
invisible suddenly come to the fore. This was the case for the
floods observers (observateurs de crues), who were formerly
employed by the State’s departmental services to control the
Vidourle’s water levels under normal circumstances, monitor
the river in case of flooding and regularly apprise departmen-
tal authorities and local actors (mayors, the population, etc.)
of the situation. We added to the list dam monitors, country
policemen, local experts (often considered the mayor’s eyes
on the ground), certain farmers, elected representatives or in-
habitants recognized for their knowledge of the river, depart-
mental authorities (the Conseil Ge´ne´ral of the Gard depart-
ment), Me´te´o France’s media service, and waterways author-
ities (Voies Navigables de France), etc.
Our sample thus considers all the actors seen as involved
in practice during hydro-meteorological warnings for the Vi-
dourle watershed. The sample is characterized by its hetero-
geneity in terms of actors and the range of spatial (town, wa-
tershed, departmental, regional and national levels) and tem-
poral scales (from ten minutes to a whole week) involved.
3.4 Data and analysis
The data were collected from October 2007 to September
2008. During 11 weeks in the field, we:
– collected 93 semi-directive interviews with actors;
– observed in situ the CNP, SCHAPI and emergency re-
sponse units;
– collected 3 notebooks from town halls, 4 post-event re-
ports on the 2005 event (from different authorities), and
numerous technical and historical documents on the Vi-
dourle.
We spent a great deal of time visiting the places and areas,
and this travel time provided us with indispensable accultur-
ation, allowing us to get to know the area and improving the
quality of the interactions during interviews.
The interviews were transcribed, word for word, before
the analysis, which was conducted in two phases. First, we
scanned the 72 interviews to identify the occurrences of the
word “uncertainty”, we counted them and analyzed its distri-
bution (see Sect. 3.1). Next, we looked at the content of these
interviews, so as to better grasp how actors expressed the
problem of uncertainty, linked to forecasting tools, in their
specific context of practice. This second phase allowed us to
see how the problem of uncertainty is expressed by the actors
of the warning process.
To observe and analyze all the actors on the same grid,
the analysis was framed both by a longitudinal reading of
each actor’s practices, as well as a transversal and compara-
tive reading for all the actors involved in the warning pro-
cess. It was then possible to code the interviews for each
actor in a qualitative database, from which we can make
statistical analyses. Multi-factor statistical analyses on this
data base (principal component analysis (PCA) and ascen-
dant hierarchical classification (HAC)) enabled us to es-
tablish profiles of actors involved in the warning process,
characterized by their practices and the role of uncertain-
ties (for more details on the statistical analysis, see (Cre´ton-
Cazanave, 2010b)).
Note that these profiles of actors must be understood as
ideal types. They are an abstract model that, when used as a
standard of comparison, enables us to see aspects of the real
world in a clearer, more systematic way. It is a constructed
ideal used to approximate reality by selecting and accentu-
ating certain elements (Weber, 1965). These profiles should
then not be understood as a description of some precise indi-
vidual, whose practices may indeed fall under different pro-
files.
4 Results
It makes sense to expose first our findings about the use of the
word “uncertainty” by the actors when they talk about their
practices and issues for action during a warning process. It
makes it even clearer that uncertainty can not be understood
prior to the action process.
4.1 Uncertainty: not such a big deal?
From the scanning of semi-directive interviews, several im-
portant quantitative findings came to light:
The word uncertainty only appeared in 12 of the
72 interviews scanned, and of those 12, only 8 actors used
the word spontaneously (i.e. without being prompted by the
interviewer).
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If we look more closely at these 12 interviews, we find
55 occurrences of the word uncertainty. Considering that
these semi-directive interviews total 357 pages, or approx-
imately 183 500 words, we can assume that uncertainty is
mentioned roughly once every six pages. If we take out
those occurrences linked to the interviewer, that leaves
28 occurrences of the word, as said by the interviewee, ap-
proximately once every 13 pages.
When we look more closely when interviewees evoked un-
certainty, we find that forecasters spoke most openly about
this issue (Me´te´o France, SCHAPI, SPC, and others). In re-
fining our analysis of these particular interviews, we nonethe-
less noted that uncertainty, as thought by our geoscientist col-
leagues in the MedUp program (especially in a quantitative
way), appeared very infrequently.
However, numerous problems linked to forecasting tools
were brought up, which gives us insight into the form of the
problem for actors involved in warning process, even if they
are not expressed explicitly as uncertainty.
4.2 Issues for actors: uncertainty or discrepancy?
The practice-based study of warning demands that we trust
actors and take their discourse and practices as a basis for
redefining what can be considered uncertainty, in terms of
issues with regard to their action. As a result of the classifica-
tion performed on the built qualitative database, we propose
characterizing the actor profiles and defining uncertainty for
each of them.
4.2.1 Profile 1 – the Translators
Actors who fall into the Profile 1 category share skills in
terms of forecasting phenomena (but without necessarily be-
ing an official forecaster) and the fact that they were out-
side the watershed in this case. Translators are experts when
it comes to interpreting phenomena and models. They are
also extremely conscious of the problems of interpreting en-
countered by non-experts vis-a`-vis phenomena and forecast-
ing tools and products. They are greatly concerned with the
problems of interpretation and comprehension between their
field of expertise (weather forecasting, weather phenomena)
and that of non-experts, and thus position themselves at the
interface between the forecasting world and that of non-
forecasters, with the job of linking the two. In the warning
process, Translators position themselves more or less up-
stream (interpreting the environment), distinguishing them-
selves by their desire to produce meaning rather than data.
The problem with regard to action mentioned by Transla-
tors is the non-identity between the results of models and the
reality of the environment they are supposed to describe. This
problem results as much from the inherent limits of models
as from the question of scale: a mayor cannot consider a re-
gional weather forecast as viable to the reality of his imme-
diate environment. For Translators, this non-identity, or dis-
crepancy between information and the reality in which actors
must act, is not so much a problem for them as it is for oth-
ers. In the warning process, Translators’ role is to facilitate
the adapting of information resulting from tools to a specific
context for different actors to use. These important skills in
terms of tools allow them to easily play with information and
its limits. Potential discrepancies in no way stop them from
doing their job, but can, however, pose a problem for other
actors. This explains their position at the interface between
forecasting and the risk management.
4.2.2 Profile 2 – the Managers
The Profile 2 is characterized first and foremost by its inter-
mediate position, one that we find almost anywhere in the
warning process, from the forecaster to the rural policeman.
Their uniqueness has less to do with required skills than per-
sonal and professional posture. Managers are characterized
above all by the importance they give to procedure, regard-
less of their position in it. We could consider them as ideal
actors in the warning system. Their concerns are extremely
targeted, depending on their job. While they are extremely
invested in their incumbent duties, they also know the limits
and do not necessarily try to go outside of them.
The Managers are characterized by their implication in
the forward planning typical of warning systems. This for-
ward planning takes the form of different maps, procedures
and regulations that organize the distribution of tasks among
the actors involved in the warning process. In this context,
Managers are characterized by the great attention they pay
to these procedures, as well as how they adhere to them; they
take responsibility for the duties assigned to them by the pro-
cedure, but not more. What counts is not their individuality
but the continuity of the post. Managers can be described as
individuals who carry out and respect procedures.
What seems to worry Managers most is also the discrep-
ancy between information about the environment and the re-
ality. The question for them is more direct and more concrete,
however: how can they base their action on information that
is not valid for the environment targeted by their action? The
problem raised by Managers has in fact little to do with tech-
nical uncertainty. It results rather from the choices (political
and scientific) that have led to the production of information
at certain scales or for certain phenomena; information that
does not serve necessarily as a relevant basis for their action.
Their position with regard to action is technocratic, proce-
dural and not really geographically rooted, requiring specific
scientific information upon which to base their actions.
In this context, the discrepancies between available infor-
mation and the reality targeted by the action become ex-
tremely problematic because they correspond to the failure of
the primary resource of action. Managers, unlike Translators,
are therefore in no way able to use information that proves
not valid for their own context. These discrepancies may then
seriously endanger the carrying out of action. Managers are
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the ones who most often question forecasts, not so much in
terms of its quality (or the degree of uncertainty) as it rele-
vancy (the forecast does not concern what they are interested
in). Therefore, they often call upon Translators, or depend
greatly on the procedures and predetermined thresholds so
as to justify their actions.
4.2.3 Profile 3 – the Committed
The 3rd profile is centered, more so than any other, around
the human actors involved in the warning process. The Com-
mitted are those actors who intervene directly in the wa-
tershed and department. They are characterized by their at-
tention to the issue of floods and flooding, and are univer-
sally recognized for their background, skills and experience
in these subjects. In fact, the Committed can be seen as Man-
agers who go above and beyond the call of procedure.
Thus, this profile is quite remarkable due to the importance
of its intersubjective relationships with other actors, and by
the autonomy it demands with regard to technical and pro-
cedural systems and prescriptive authorities. More than any
other profile, the Committed demonstrate a strong sense of
belonging to the group responsible for warning processes
and the resulting need to position itself with regard to its
actors. This type of actor positions itself in close proximity
to the terrain and as a critical user of all the information on
the environment (forecasts most notably) produced by these
other actors. Finally, the Committed trust other warning ac-
tors to produce and provide them with information on the en-
vironment, which they then confirm through their own sen-
sitive and personal experience. These actors are character-
ized by (and recognized for) their personal investment in the
warning process, which can be compared to what is usually
called vocation in sociology (Weber, 1919). The Committed
therefore see the problem of floods from the point of view of
vulnerability rather than the phenomenon.
For the Committed, the discrepancy between information
originating from models and the reality of their environment
is source data that gets integrated from the very planning
stages of the action. Less vindictive than Managers, they
consider this discrepancy as unavoidable and thus tend to
increase the number of their sources of information (to not
depend on forecasts alone) in order to effectively base their
actions in a given context. They can admit to these discrep-
ancies and the fact that information and forecasts are not en-
tirely valid for real life, as they are able to rely on other input
to understand this reality and as this does not stop them from
taking action. Most notably, they can rely on Translators to
complement or mitigate the limitations of forecasts.
4.2.4 Profile 4 – the Navigators
Actors in the Profile 4 have in common their scientific ex-
pertise in terms of forecasting, the fact that they are outside
the watershed and that they tend to act at the regional and
national levels. They are also characterized by their interme-
diate position between two professions: forecaster and jour-
nalist, researcher and operational.
Remarkably, as compared to other profiles, Navigators
demonstrate an ability to take great critical distance to ob-
jects in the warning process (tools, supports and data), and
can be seen as reflexive specialists as well as operational spe-
cialists. They are characterized by their great attention to the
compatibility between actors’ environments of action. They
seem most concerned with creating good supports for action
in the warning process. Compared to Translators, who also
evoked the difficulties of translating between environments
and finding themselves at the interface, striving to translate
toward other environments, Navigators are comfortable in
several environments and act as heralds from one to another,
but without attempting to create bridges or points of trans-
lation between the two. We can say that they tend to make
themselves unavoidable in some situations.
Navigators likewise brought up the issue of discrepancy,
and consider as a key problem the fact that information from
forecasts is not valid to reality. They link this to both the limi-
tations of models and the problem of scales, and consider that
this is one of the basic problems in the warning process, one
that has an unquestionable impact on the quality of warnings.
As with Translators, this is not a problem for them, as their
knowledge of models and of the field allows them to extract
the information they need. On the other hand, Navigators are
worried about the impact these discrepancies have on the rest
of the warning process.
4.2.5 Profile 5 – the Vulnerable
The 5th profile essentially includes inhabitants of riverside
towns, who typically are not seen as actors in the warning
process. The Vulnerable are above all characterized by the
relatively few and extremely localized means of action they
have. The problem for Vidourle riverside residents is that of
flooding and the likelihood of water invading their private
environments with a devastating impact. This physical prox-
imity to the river, however, allows for easy access to the river
and, as such, continuous monitoring. Their social and geo-
graphical proximity to local actors results in great trust in the
efficiency of their social networks for warnings.
This profile is therefore structured by a very practical vi-
sion of the problem: Is the Vidourle going to stay in its own
bed or end up in mine? Such is the direct constraint the river
imposes on these individuals and with regards to which they
are rather unfortunate: one cannot stop the water from com-
ing; one can only limit the damages.
This is the only profile that is not institutionally involved
in the warning process. Its role is that of the final recipient
and judge of the warning process. The Vulnerable in this way
correspond perfectly to the classic conception of the popula-
tion. Nonetheless, we might ask ourselves to what extent this
www.nat-hazards-earth-syst-sci.net/13/1469/2013/ Nat. Hazards Earth Syst. Sci., 13, 1469–1479, 2013
1476 L. Cre´ton-Cazanave and C. Lutoff: Action during the warning process
wait-and-see position should be seen as a justification for the
classic approach to warning, or as a consequence of it.
The description of actor profiles and their relationship to
uncertainty allows us to better understand what is at stake
during the warning process. We will now capsulate this in-
formation to offer a more in-depth analysis of the action con-
texts and how uncertainty is dealt with.
5 Synthesis and discussion
The table below (Table 1) provides a summary of the infor-
mation described above and a more general view of the re-
lationship between action context, practices and problems of
uncertainty. Note that during the interviews, some of the ac-
tors made mention of solutions to deal with the problems we
identified. A more in-depth analysis of these strategies is cur-
rently underway.
We deliberately organized the actor profiles to highlight
their similarities and differences. We see that Translators and
Navigators are quite close in terms of how they handle situa-
tions of crisis and uncertainty. They have technical skills that
allow them to grasp the meaning of uncertainty in forecast-
ing tools, without it hampering their action. They are aware
of what really poses a problem for actors involved in the
warning process: the discrepancy between forecasts (output
from models) at a specific scale and the scale of action in
the field (i.e. a watershed, for instance). In practice, they are
both involved in interpreting or adapting the information for
facilitating local action.
This puts both of these sets of actors in a position of
strength in the warning process. However, the main differ-
ence between these two actor profiles is that Translators,
whose action is close to the field, try to lessen the discrep-
ancies, while Navigators, who are offsite, have no real grasp
on local action and maintain a non-specialized position in the
warning process.
We can also draw similarities between Managers and the
Committed, who can position themselves anywhere in the
warning chain. Both are perfectly familiar with the prede-
fined procedures for handling a warning. For them, uncer-
tainty results in this qualitative discrepancy between fore-
casting and the field, especially in terms of scales of refer-
ence. This discrepancy, however, does not have the same im-
pact on their practices. While they completely immobilize
the action of Managers, which is rooted in procedure, the
Committed, strengthened by their experience, see it as source
of data, adapt to it and seek solutions to act in spite of it.
The Vulnerable distinguish themselves by their wait-and-
see attitude with regard to the warning process with, in prac-
tice, a monitoring of the situation. We must be careful to
avoid any confusion between the Vulnerable and the popula-
tion at-risk. While proximity to the river (i.e. danger) is a key
characteristic for this profile, all riverside residents cannot be
defined as Vulnerable in the sense that we mean here: some,
by their skills and/or experience, can be defined as Commit-
ted or Translators in profile.
If we focus on action contexts and relationships to uncer-
tainty, we can make the following observations:
– Technical and scientific knowledge with regard to fore-
casts makes it possible to deal with the uncertainty in-
herent to them. As several authors have underlined (see
Sect. 1.1), the accuracy of the data as regards this uncer-
tainty then serves as additional information that is in no
way harmful to action;
– Clear awareness of the problems encountered by field
actors in using forecast data (and the issue of scale
more specifically), coupled with a technical knowledge
of models, grants certain actors a kind of power in the
warning process;
– Rooting in pre-established procedure and legitimization
of action exclusively with regards to a plan weakens ac-
tion. Uncertainty (regardless of the form) then becomes
an impediment;
– A wait-and-see attitude (to which the preceding instance
can also be added) fosters a way of handling risks that is
more or less curative. As early action entirely depends
on other actors (or procedures), the actors concerned ul-
timately find themselves in the critical situation of crisis
management, in which there is no room for uncertainty
(because the danger is manifest);
– Experience obviously plays an essential role. Coupled
with voluntary commitment closer to the action and ter-
rain, it is indispensable for finding solutions that are
suited to circumstances that are inherently uncertain.
If we go back to the questions and hypotheses raised in the
literature review, the analysis conducted here offers several
clues.
The first concerns actors’ expectations in terms of fore-
casting. Several authors say that actors responsible for man-
aging floods demand detailed information, including details
about uncertainty. This information seems indispensable for
them to be able to assess the situation by themselves and
evaluate the possible alternatives. The analysis conducted
here shows that this holds true for actors who possess some
form of expertise and the scientific/technical knowledge re-
quired to interpret this information and extract from it that
which will help them act. Other actors are, on the contrary, in
need of translation of this information (i.e. an adaptation for
their specific action context). Some private companies (cur-
rently appearing in France) have understood this and are tak-
ing on the role of translator at the interface between forecast-
ers and local actors.
Note that our approach can introduce a bias. We chose not
to focus the interviews on uncertainties, assuming that the is-
sue would indirectly emerge through the description of prac-
tices. But this option could have led some actors to ignore
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Table 1. Synthesis of the relationships between actor profiles, action context and uncertainty.
Profiles Action context Practices in the warning
process
Problem of uncertainty
The Translator – Experts in interpreting phenomena
– Technical knowledge of models
– Concerned with the difficulties of
other actors




– Translates forecasts for
local and operational
actors
– No particular problems as regards
their own action
– Discrepancies between the output
of models and the reality of the
environment in question
(identified for the other actors)
The Navigator – Scientific expertise in forecasting
(technical knowledge of tools)
– Critical attitude to tools and data from
action processes (reflexive position)
– Offsite (action at the regional or
national level)
– Sensitive to the problems of other
actors without being in contact with
them
– Creates and improves
media for information
– Tries to address and
diminish the discrepancy
between models/real
situation, in long term.
– No particular problems as regards
their own action
– The discrepancy between the output
of models and the reality of the
situation identified as the main
problem in the warning process
The Manager – Can be found anywhere in the
warning chain
– Importance given to procedure
(prescription) and the legitimacy of a
given action
– Applies procedures
and follows the rules,
whatever they are
– Expects the others will do
the same
– The discrepancy between
information about the environment
(output from models) and the real
environment
– Uncertainty weakens the very basis
of action (procedure)
The Committed – Relationship with other actors
fundamental for action
– Close to the field: locally recognized
for their experience
– Committed to action (vocation)
– Profile comparable to that of
Managers, but with the ability to step
outside of procedure
– Interprets and adapts the
procedure according to
the local situation and
constraints
– Acts beyond the
procedure when it seems
relevant
– Uncertainty = discrepancy between
the forecasted and the real
– Acts as source data for action.
Searches for alternative solutions
The Vulnerable – Physical proximity to the river
– Strong sense of belonging to different
networks (neighborhood, friends,
colleagues, etc.)
– Standby recipient of warnings




– Shares information within
his networks and takes
advice from local experts
– Did not mention uncertainty in their
discourse
– Problem = will there be overflow?
If so, how to limit the damages?
– No uncertainty, as overflowing can
be established visually
the problem of uncertainties, as external to the specific topic
of the interviews, even if the interviewer encouraged them to
explore this question.
A second question concerns accurate definition of the
needs of forecasts users in the warning process. What we
have learned from our analysis is that these needs differ from
one actor to another and are directly linked to their prob-
lems of action. The Committed do not have the same needs
in terms of information in order to act as Managers and Nav-
igators do. And yet, these problems of action do not only de-
pend on their socio-professional status : depending on how
they perceive their action, one meteorological forecaster can
be a Manager and another forecaster can be a Committed,
even though they belong to the same institution.
Knowing their duties and their role in the warning chain
alone is not sufficient; it is crucial to understand their prob-
lems and action contexts in order to define their needs and
assess the impact of uncertainty on their actions. The pro-
posed approach aims to progress on this way. However, the
definition of these categories of actors is based here on one
specific case study. It has to be tested in other contexts for
assessing its robustness.
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6 Conclusions
Upon concluding this analysis, we find that uncertainty as
thought of and explored within the framework of the MedUp
program (like the imprecision and margins of error inherent
to the models) seldom comes up in the discourses of warning
actors. It only seems a matter of concern to the actors directly
involved in forecasting.
However, another form of uncertainty, not necessarily
identified as such by actors, appears as a key problem when
it comes time to alert: a discrepancy between the informa-
tion conveyed (forecasts) and the reality of the environment
in question, especially in terms of scale (i.e. the forecast is
not necessarily valid for the environment in which each actor
intervenes).
The practice-based approach allowed us to better charac-
terize this form of uncertainty and to better understand its
impact on the decision making process in warning situation.
We showed that in some cases, it can lead to inaction, partic-
ularly when the procedure is the single context of action. In
other situations, uncertainty leads to an interpretation of the
situation and to an adaptation for allowing the action.
As shown in previous works, there is a gap between the
information provided by forecasters and the users of this in-
formation. However, this does not affect the degree of un-
certainty as much as the harmonizing of information and the
action context in question. The real problem for warnings is
not knowing whether a forecast is 92 or 95 % reliable. What
can be a constraint for action to issue a warning instead con-
cerns the scale of the forecast, and the fact that this scale
does not necessarily correspond to that of the action. This is
particularly true with regard to flash floods, a phenomenon
that shows great variability depending on the scales consid-
ered (Creutin et al., 2011). Thus, issuing a level orange alert
at the department-wide scale in Gard is not sufficient for ac-
tors who must direct and base their action(s) in the Vidourle
watershed or any of the towns therein.
A second important lesson stemming from this work has
to do with the actors themselves. Thanks to this practice-
based study of the warning process, we highlight categories
of actors that greatly differ from those typically predefined in
studies on warning systems. Translators, Managers and the
Vulnerable, for instance, correspond to actors that could be-
long to the building trade and very diverse social statuses. A
riverside resident can either be a Translator or Committed,
based on his/her action, or Vulnerable. The methodological
option we used allowed us to break down predefined actor
categories and rebuild profiles based on problems of action
and actors’ concrete practices, regardless of their position in
the warning chain or their socio-professional status.
By outlining the practical dimension of the warning pro-
cess (beyond its communicational aspects), by taking into ac-
count concrete actors’ practices, and by offering a compari-
son of the all the actors involved, this kind of practice-based
study enabled us to gain new perspective on the warning pro-
cess and to better understand what is at stake in the hours that
precede an extreme weather event.
This method has been tested on a single case study, with
regard to flash flood warnings. However, it is currently being
applied to other systems of actors and other processes: in-
formation regarding road conditions during unstable hydro-
meteorological episodes, as part of the ANR PReDiFlood
project for instance, or landslide monitoring and manage-
ment as part of the ANR SLAMS.
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